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INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana is Sportsman’s Paradise—home to some of the most sought-
after hunting, fishing, and nature-viewing opportunities in the world.1 
Seeking to net the best catch, sportsmen and commercial fishermen scour 
Louisiana’s coast. Due to the current legal landscape and Louisiana’s 
constantly morphing coastal environment, however, these fishermen often 
find that lawfully using Louisiana’s coastal waters is impossible.  
Unlike most other coastal states, the vast majority of Louisiana’s 
coastal lands are private.2 These lands are swiftly submerging,3 as 
Louisiana loses the equivalent of a football field of coastal land every 
hour.4 Under the current practice in Louisiana, many of these large tracts 
of coastal land remain in private hands after they submerge.5 As a result, 
even to the trained eye, the line between public and private coastal 
property is often indiscernible. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by JACQUES MESTAYER. 
 1. Craig Gautreaux, Keeping Louisiana a Sportsman’s Paradise, LSUAG 
CENTER.COM, http://www.lsuagcenter.com/en/communications/publications/agmag 
/Archive/2012/Spring/Keeping-Louisiana-a-Sportsmans-Paradise.htm [perma.cc/KX 
D4-ENY2] (last updated June 24, 2012, 6:32 PM) (noting Louisiana has long been 
known as “Sportsman’s Paradise” and highlighting the many sporting opportunities 
available in Louisiana). 
 2. See Brett Anderson, Louisiana Loses Its Boot, MATTER (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://medium.com/matter/louisiana-loses-its-boot-b55b3bd52d1e [perma.cc/H6C9-
FCM5] (noting that 80% of Louisiana’s coastal environment is private). 
 3. See ROBERT R. TWILLEY, COASTAL WETLANDS & GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: GULF COAST WETLANDS SUSTAINABILITY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 5 
(2007), available at http://nctc.fws.gov/courses/csp/csp3112/resources/Climate 
_Change/GulfCoastImpacts.pdf [perma.cc/GDW6-D2H7]. 
 4. See Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana is Losing a Football Field of Wetlands 
Every Hour, New U.S. Geological Survey Study Says, NOLA.COM (June 2, 2011, 
9:37 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/06/louisiana_is_losing 
_a_football.html [perma.cc/S8XT-ZADB]. 
 5. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Civil Div., La. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 23, 2014). This Comment questions the 
legitimacy of this result.  
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In 2006, the Louisiana Legislature realized that permitting private 
ownership of some submerged lands made the public’s utilization of state 
lands and water bottoms difficult.6 As a result, the legislature commissioned 
the State Lands Office to use an interactive mapping system to determine 
the ownership of Louisiana’s lands and water bottoms.7 As the State Lands 
Office began reviewing Louisiana’s coast, it found that large areas of 
submerged land were formerly private land.8 Believing that, under article 
450 of the Louisiana Civil Code,9 ownership of these lands reverted to the 
State once the land became submerged, Louisiana informally claimed title 
to the lands through the State Lands Office review.10 Prominent private 
landowners strongly opposed these title claims and began lobbying the State 
Lands Office not to take formal action.11 Apparently overlooking that article 
450 may dictate that many submerged lands belong to the State,12 the State 
Lands Office officials decided that a further assertion of State ownership 
would lead to an onslaught of litigation that the State could not afford.13 In 
the absence of a legislative solution to the problem, and in an effort to 
minimize litigation, the State Lands Office opted to classify most of the 
submerged land as “claimed by the state and the adjoining property owner” 
and cautioned citizens to enter at their own risk.14 Instead of clearing up 
titles, this classification clouded title to vast areas of submerged land. 
Although any state’s failure to declare that it owns certain areas of 
submerged land would be problematic, that failure is especially problematic 
for Louisiana because Louisiana’s coastal environment is submerging faster 
than any other landmass in the United States.15 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id. Because there is a history of trespassing within Louisiana’s coastal 
marshlands and waterbottoms, the Louisiana Legislature presumably knew of this 
difficulty well before 2006. For an example of such a trespassing case, see La. 
Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm’n of La., 51 So. 706 (La. 1910). 
 7. See S. Res. 115, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006). 
 8. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5. 
 9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (“Public things that belong to the state are 
such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, 
the territorial sea, and the seashore.”). 
 10. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5. 
 14. Id. This land category and disclaimer can be viewed in the legend on the 
Louisiana Office of State Lands’ website. Disclaimer for SONRIS Interactive 
Maps, SONRIS, http://sonris-www.dnr.state.la.us/gis/agsweb/IE/JSViewer/index 
.html?TemplateID=381 [perma.cc/NV8M-U6RB] (last visited Oct. 21, 2015). 
 15. See TWILLEY, supra note 3, at 5.  
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Between 1932 and 2000, Louisiana lost over one million acres of 
coastal land to the Gulf of Mexico’s inescapable grasp.16 Due to a variety 
of natural processes,17 over a million more acres of land will likely 
submerge within the next 50 years.18 By then, Louisiana’s total land loss 
will be roughly equivalent to two times the entire landmass of Delaware.19 
Though some mitigating measures are in place,20 severe land loss will 
continue unless the state or federal government subsidizes drastic 
corrective action.21  
As time passes, a combination of natural and manmade forces will 
submerge larger quantities of Louisiana’s coast, thereby creating an 
underwater labyrinth riddled with tracts of private land.22 Thus, promptly 
declaring the ownership of submerged lands is imperative to give Louisiana’s 
citizens some valuable direction regarding what lands are public. The 
legislature should take note of the current and future issues regarding 
submerged lands and formally declare ownership over them. Until then, 
Louisiana’s citizens remain deprived of not only valuable property rights, 
but also significant revenue from mineral transactions that accompany 
State-owned submerged lands. 
Part I of this Comment introduces the growing controversy involving 
submerged coastal lands in Louisiana and illustrates the unique 
                                                                                                             
 16. See Anderson, supra note 2. For a noteworthy geomorphology study 
describing extensive land change as a simple and expected result of delta lobe 
switching, see David E. Frazier, Recent Deltaic Deposits of the Mississippi River: 
Their Development and Chronology, 17 GULF COAST ASS’N GEOLOGICAL 
SOC’IES TRANSACTIONS 287 (1967). For an in-depth presentation exploring land 
loss, land change, and the natural factors responsible for most of the coastal 
change in Louisiana, see Chris McLindon, PowerPoint Presentation, Rethinking 
Coastal Restoration: The Delta Cycle and Land Area Change in the Louisiana 
Coastal Plain, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/The_Delta_Cycle_and_Land 
_Area_Change_in_Coastal_Louisiana.pptx (last visited Oct. 24, 2015). 
 17. See TWILLEY, supra note 3, at 4–5. Louisiana’s total land loss is 
undoubtedly due to a combination of natural and man-caused forces. Id. However, 
due to the different and numerous concerns present when human action causes 
land loss, this Comment seeks only to address land issues caused by natural forces. 
 18. See Anderson, supra note 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
ON WETLANDS 67 (1994); LA. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH., 
LOUISIANA’S COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 29 (2012), 
available at http://issuu.com/coastalmasterplan/docs/coastal_master_plan-v2?e=372 
2998/2447530 [perma.cc/C2NE-4FNQ]. 
 21. See id. at 19. 
 22. See Anderson, supra note 2. 
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significance that these lands offer to the people of Louisiana. Part II 
focuses on the origin and historical treatment of submerged lands in 
Louisiana, specifically concentrating on the scope of Louisiana Civil Code 
article 450 and the jurisprudence dealing with its categories, namely 
“natural navigable water bottoms,” “arms of the sea,” and “seashore.” Part 
III recognizes that the State owns submerged lands that became natural 
navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore prior to alienation by 
the State.23 Further, Part III argues that no sound reason exists to 
distinguish natural navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore 
that existed before state alienation and those that came into existence 
following state alienation. Finally, Part IV contemplates potential remedies 
to this arbitrary distinction regarding submerged lands and then proposes 
a legislative amendment that will clearly assert the State’s ownership over 
those submerged lands, thereby ensuring that private landowners shall no 
longer reap fruits lawfully belonging to the State of Louisiana.  
I. THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF LOUISIANA’S SUBMERGED COASTAL 
MARSHLANDS SHOULD PROMPT THE STATE TO FORMALLY 
DECLARE OWNERSHIP OVER THEM 
A growing “emphasis on coastal resource management and increasing 
conflicts of interest between private owners and the state have led to . . . 
‘a tidal wave’ of boundary disputes” throughout the coastal United 
States.24 Louisiana is no stranger to this phenomenon. In fact, the battle 
between public interests and private property rights is particularly fierce 
in Louisiana.25  
Fearful of surrendering any of their land due to the significant 
economic and property losses that would occur, private landowners 
strongly oppose a declaration that the ownership of formerly dry ground 
reverts to the State upon submersion.26 These landowners believe that 
                                                                                                             
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 31 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “alienation” as a 
“[c]onveyance or transfer of property to another”). 
 24. See Sue Nichols, Tidal Boundary Delimitation: Some North American 
Perspectives, N.Z. SURVEYOR, Feb. 1987, at 560, 570, available at http://coast 
.noaa.gov/mbwg/_pdf/biblio/Nichols.pdf [perma.cc/N9YY-CYF4]. 
 25. See Katy Reckdahl, Mixing Oil and Water: An Inside Look at What 
Happens When Land Sinks and Oil Money is on the Line, WEATHER CHANNEL, 
http://stories.weather.com/mixingoilandwater [perma.cc/P86M-M237] (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015). 
 26. Id. For this land to become State-owned, it must submerge to such an 
extent that it could properly be classified as either a natural navigable water 
bottom, sea bottom, or seashore. See infra Part II.A. 
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forcing them to relinquish land to the State merely because Mother Nature 
irrepressibly overtakes their land is unfair.27 This usurpation of land 
appears even more unjust considering that billions of dollars in minerals 
lie beneath these lands. Although a change in ownership of the submerged 
land would not affect existing mineral rights that already burden the 
submerged land28—such as mineral leases, royalty agreements, or 
servitude agreements—private landowners would still lose all future 
mineral rights to that land.29  
In stark contrast to the interests of private landowners, Louisiana’s 
sportsmen and commercial fishermen favor a declaration that the State 
owns certain submerged lands. The more submerged lands the State owns, 
the more area these individuals can utilize for their business and pleasure.30 
According to a survey conducted by the American Sportfishing Association, 
in 2001, non-resident anglers spent approximately five million hours fishing 
in Louisiana.31 That year, the sportfishing industry reeled in approximately 
$959 million in retail sales, $453 million in salaries and wages, and $93 
million in state and local tax revenues.32 One cannot overstate this industry’s 
value to the people of Louisiana; however, Louisiana’s coastal environment 
is even more highly valued for commercial fishing purposes. Louisiana’s 
commercial fishing industry regularly nets nearly $2 billion in sales.33 
Such a significant contribution to the economy is unsurprising because this 
                                                                                                             
 27. Reckdahl, supra note 25. 
 28. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1151 (2006) (dictating that when the title to 
land transfers to another through a variety of ways, including naturally caused 
land loss, the transferee of title receives the land without affecting some 
encumbrances of mineral rights). 
 29. Id. Importantly, however, a declaration that the State owns certain 
submerged coastal lands would not have a significant net effect on oil and gas 
exploration and extraction. Rather, a declaration would merely change the 
primary beneficiaries of those efforts. The State, instead of private landowners, 
would have the right to lease the submerged land and to receive mineral royalties 
and bonuses. 
 30. See, e.g., Todd Masson, Popular South Louisiana Fishing Area Now Off-
Limits to Anglers, NOLA.COM (Aug. 1, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://www.nola.com/out 
doors/index.ssf/2014/08/popular_fishing_area_now_off-l.html [perma.cc/UX8V-
3TA3]. 
 31. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NOAA, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
FISHERIES ECONOMICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 130 (2014), available at 
http://media.nola.com/environment/other/Fisheries%20Economics%20of%20the
%20U.S.%202012.pdf [perma.cc/A8CT-BWUP]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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industry hauls in nearly 25% of all the seafood in the United States.34 
Opening up more of Louisiana’s coastal environment to sportsmen and 
commercial fishermen would cause an appreciable increase in profits for 
all of these industries. 
Although both sides have significant interests and compelling reasons 
for their position on the issue, private landowners’ interests have prevailed 
up until this point. Oil and gas companies, the most prominent private 
landowners of Louisiana’s marshlands, employ nearly 300,000 people in 
Louisiana.35 Louisiana’s oil and gas industry generates over $20 billion in 
household earnings annually.36 Because of its pervasive economic impact, 
that industry has influence. Nevertheless, Louisiana’s policies and laws 
should not neglect the interests of Louisiana’s sportsmen and commercial 
fishermen.37 Leaving so many coastal boundaries unsettled not only 
deprives those individuals of substantial revenue, it also exposes them to 
criminal trespass liability.38 Declaring that the State owns certain 
submerged lands would allow sportsmen and commercial fishermen to 
access more land while having little net effect on oil and gas exploration 
and extraction in Louisiana.39 
                                                                                                             
 34. A Look at Louisiana Agriculture, AGCLASSROOM.ORG, https://www.agclass 
room.org/teacher/stats/louisiana.pdf [perma.cc/G8GR-H83B] (last visited Oct. 30, 
2015).  
 35. See Newest Economic Impact Study Reinforces Oil and Gas Industry’s 
Importance to Louisiana, GROW LA. COAL. (July 10, 2014), http://www.grow 
louisianacoalition.com/newest-economic-impact-study-reinforces-oil-gas-industrys- 
importance-louisiana/ [perma.cc/MN6F-A6SC]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including 
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the 
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible 
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature 
shall enact laws to implement this policy.”). 
 38. For decades, law enforcement agencies have fined and arrested anglers, 
crawfish fishermen, hunters, and other types of sportsmen for trespassing on 
submerged land. See, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App. 
1989); State v. Barras, 602 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Buckskin Hunting 
Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 39. See supra note 29. In the event that submerged lands become state-
owned, pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1151, existing mineral 
rights remain unaffected. However, any new mineral rights, meaning those that 
did not burden the land at the time ownership reverted but that subsequently 
burden the land after ownership changes, will become vested in the State. 
Although this would effectively remove these mineral interests from the hands of 
private landowners, little net effect on oil and gas exploration and extraction 
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II. THE HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND JURISPRUDENCE PERTAINING TO 
SUBMERGED LAND OWNERSHIP IN LOUISIANA  
Due to the vast economic and sentimental value of Louisiana’s 
submerged coastal marshlands, declaring that the State owns certain 
submerged coastal lands is vitally important to the people of Louisiana. 
Examining the history of Louisiana’s coastal environment elucidates how 
such a significant mass of submerged land found its way into private hands 
in the first place. 
A. Tracing the Origin of Louisiana’s Privately Owned Coastal 
Marshlands 
Currently, most of Louisiana’s coastal marshlands are private.40 This 
private ownership is an anomaly, as most states have a broad reach with 
respect to coastal land ownership.41 This abnormality in Louisiana is 
largely attributable to the Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850,42 
which gave Louisiana an estimated nine million acres of “swamp and 
overflowed lands” that were unfit for cultivation.43 The collective purpose 
of these grants was to permit Louisiana to sell these lands and use the 
proceeds to protect valuable agricultural lands near the banks of the 
Mississippi River.44 In furtherance of this objective, Louisiana began 
passing legislation permitting the alienation of a vast amount of coastal 
swamplands.45 In particular, the legislature passed Act 75 of 1880 that 
seemingly extended the alienability of Louisiana’s lands beyond the 
original scope of the Swamp Land Grants. Although those federal grants 
gave Louisiana “swamp and overflowed lands,” Act 75 allowed the 
                                                                                                             
would occur, because oil and gas companies would still likely want to lease lands 
from the State to explore for minerals due to the profits that these companies 
would be able to realize via production. 
 40. See Anderson, supra note 2. 
 41. For example, Mississippi claims state ownership over all lands naturally 
subject to tidal influence up to the present-day mean high water mark. See Cinque 
Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) (“Only those lands, 
not tidelands in 1817, which have become such via the natural process of accretion 
or the general rising or inland expansion of the tide have in law been added to the 
trust so that title is held by the State.”). 
 42. Cf. Patrick G. Tracy, Jr., Public Use Issues, 54TH MIN. L. INST., Apr. 12–
13, 2007, at II-5 n.14. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Act No. 247, 1855 La. Acts 306; Act No. 306, 1855 La. Acts 372. 
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alienation of “sea marsh or prairie, subject to tidal overflow.”46 As noted 
by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos:  
This Act was destined to create confusion [because] it seemed to 
obliterate the difference between lands “subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide[,]” [otherwise known as lands subject to tidal 
overflow] that Louisiana acquired from the United States under 
the equal footing doctrine, and “swamp lands subject to overflow” 
that Louisiana acquired from the United States under the Swamp 
Land Grant Acts.47  
Indeed, after the passage of Act 75, courts began jumbling land descriptions 
by classifying “sea marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow” 
separately from “lands within the tidewaters of the sea.”48 Thus, all sea 
marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow became alienable,49 thereby 
permitting private ownership of vast areas of land highly susceptible to 
submersion. As a result, 80% of Louisiana’s coastal marshlands are now 
private.50  
Most of these private coastal marshlands either are submerged or will 
become submerged in the near future.51 Avoiding those lands when 
                                                                                                             
 46. See Act No. 75, § 11, 1880 La. Acts 87 (“That the public lands donated 
by Congress to the State of Louisiana, designated as sea marsh or prairie, subject 
to tidal overflow, so as to render them unfit for settlement and cultivation, shall 
be subject to entry and sale . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 47. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 66, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 125 (4th ed. 2001); cf. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 218 
(1845) (distinguishing between waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and 
swamplands, and noting that tidelands “between the low and high” tide that are 
covered by the ebb and flow of the tide belong to the State). 
 48. This arbitrary distinction is significant, because lands that were “sea 
marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow” were alienable, while “lands 
within the tidewaters of the sea” were inalienable. See State v. Sweet Lake Land 
& Oil Co., 113 So. 833, 836 (La. 1927). For a thorough discussion of the practical 
difficulties present when making tidal boundary determinations, see Nichols, 
supra note 24. 
 49. Cf. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 113 So. at 836 (“The Legislature, in 
providing for the sale of the vast areas of land, described ‘as sea marsh, subject to 
tidal overflow,’ acknowledged that such lands were included in the donations by 
the Congress of the United States, by the swamp land grants of 1849 and 1850, in 
which grants the lands donated were described as ‘the swamp and overflowed 
lands.’”). 
 50. See Anderson, supra note 2; Judith Perhay, Louisiana Coastal Restoration: 
Challenges and Controversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149, 153 (2000). 
 51. See text accompanying supra notes 16–18. 
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navigating, fishing, or hunting near Louisiana’s coast is a formidable 
task,52 which has become even more difficult since the passage of House 
Bill 667 in 2003. That bill removed the requirement that landowners place 
signs indicating that their land is private.53 Declaring that the State owns 
all submerged lands within the scope of Louisiana Civil Code article 450 
would allow Louisiana’s sportsmen to utilize many coastal areas without 
subjecting themselves to liability for trespassing. Further, this declaration 
would align with the explicit language in article 450. 
B. Article 450 and its Effect on the Origin of Submerged Coastal Land 
Ownership in Louisiana 
Several different types of submerged land exist in Louisiana, 
including bottoms of navigable waterways, seashores, the banks of 
streams and rivers, and beds and bottoms of bays and lagoons. The 
Louisiana Civil Code treats these submerged land categories differently 
depending on their physical qualities.  
According to the Code, submerged lands may be common, public, or 
private things.54 Article 450 of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code stated that 
common things “are those the ownership of which belongs to nobody in 
particular, and which all men may freely use . . . such as air, running water, 
the sea, and its shores.”55 That principle, however, underwent significant 
revision in 1979. The current version of that article, Louisiana Civil Code 
article 449, illustrates that common things are things “such as air and the 
high seas that may be freely used by everyone,” and that the “common” 
category no longer includes running water, the seashore, and the waters 
and beds of the sea within Louisiana’s boundaries.56 Because this 
Comment is only concerned with submerged lands, and comment (c) to 
Article 449 notes that legislation removed several types of submerged land 
from the category of common things, that category is inapplicable. Thus, 
submerged lands may be public things, or they may fall under the residual 
category of private things.57  
                                                                                                             
 52. See supra note 38. 
 53. See H.B. 667, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003). 
 54. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2015). 
 55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (1870).  
 56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 449 (2015); see also id. cmt. c. 
 57. See id. art. 453 cmt. a. 
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If submerged lands are public, they likely fall within the scope of 
article 450.58 Article 450 provides that “running waters, the waters and 
bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the 
seashore” are public things that are insusceptible of private ownership.59 
Sea bottoms, seashore, and navigable water bottoms are each a type of 
submerged land because water covers each. In addition, each category 
includes land commonly found near Louisiana’s coast. Thus, article 450 
possibly covers submerged land that private individuals owned when the 
land was above water.60 If this submerged land fits under one of the three 
land categories covered by article 450, then the land is state-owned and 
insusceptible of private ownership. 
1. The Traditional Definition of “Natural Navigable Water Bodies” 
Although article 450 dictates that the bottoms of natural navigable 
water bodies, sea bottoms, and seashore are public things, the Louisiana 
Civil Code fails to define these submerged land categories.61 Nevertheless, 
Louisiana doctrine and jurisprudence offer some guidance.62 Since the 
mid-1800s, Louisiana courts have utilized a variety of factors to define a 
“natural navigable water body,” but they have not applied the factors 
consistently.63 Despite the lack of clarity within each prong, separately 
analyzing “natural” and “navigable” is the proper approach to define the 
term “natural navigable water bodies.” If a body of water is both “natural” 
and “navigable,” then, in theory, that water body and its bottoms should 
belong to the State rather than the private parties currently claiming 
ownership.64 
                                                                                                             
 58. Cf. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116 (noting that a literal 
interpretation of article 450 could lead to a conclusion that the bottoms of newly 
navigable water bodies are public things). 
 59. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. c (“The first 
category consists of things which according to constitutional and legislative 
provisions are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its political 
subdivisions.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008). 
 60. See supra note 58. 
 61. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. f. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 64. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450. 
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a. Defining “Natural” 
Louisiana courts have consistently dealt with cases addressing the 
meaning of “natural” in article 450. In Miami Corp. v. State, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court decided the ownership of a portion of private land that 
eroded into the bed of a navigable water body.65 The court implied that 
erosion and subsidence66 are natural forces by finding that “where the[se] 
forces . . . have operated on the banks of a navigable body of water . . . the 
submerged area becomes a portion of the bed and is insusceptible of 
private ownership.”67 In Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., the United States 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals directly discussed the meaning of 
“natural.”68 Interpreting Louisiana law, the court was “persuaded that 
waterways made navigable through erosion are ‘naturally’ navigable even 
though the erosion is caused by increased water flow from a connecting 
dredged canal.”69 If manmade canals cause “natural” erosion, then, a 
fortiori, subsidence of coastal lands, sea-level rise, and erosion caused by 
wind and water are also “natural” forces. Thus, these natural forces must 
fall under the scope of “natural” in article 450. 
b. Defining “Navigable” 
For nearly two centuries, courts have dealt with cases addressing the 
meaning of “navigable.”70 Historically, a water body was navigable in law 
if the water body was navigable in fact in 1812, the year Louisiana entered 
the Union.71 In recent years, courts have expanded this interpretation. In 
Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the Louisiana Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeal found that water bodies are navigable in law if 
they became navigable in fact before the State alienated them to private 
                                                                                                             
 65. 173 So. 315 (La. 1936). 
 66. Subsidence is defined as “the sinking or settling of land to a lower level 
in response to various natural and man-caused factors.” Definition of Land 
Subsidence, ECOLOGYDICTIONARY.ORG, www.ecologydictionary.org/land_subsidence 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015). 
 67. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 322. 
 68. See 985 F.2d 824, 833 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 69. Id. (citing O’Brien v. State Mineral Bd., 24 So. 2d 470, 473 (La. 1945)). 
 70. For an early case discussing the meaning of “navigable,” see The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (9 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). 
 71. See, e.g., Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Reeves, 387 So. 2d 
1194, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (“[T]herefore, if the waterway in question was 
used for the purposes of trade and commerce in 1812, it is to be considered to 
have been a navigable body of water although it may no longer serve that 
purpose.”). 
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parties, regardless of whether they were navigable in fact in 1812.72 The 
court held that “[t]here is no sound reason to distinguish between the 
inalienable character of navigable waterbeds which existed in 1812 . . . 
and natural navigable waterbeds which, though non-navigable at the time 
such bottoms were acquired by the State . . . [became] naturally navigable 
prior to segregation by the State.”73 This holding echoed Louisiana’s 
public policy of uninterrupted navigation and transportation, which favors 
State ownership of navigable water bottoms.74 Though courts have not 
ruled on this particular question since Vermilion Bay, prominent Louisiana 
scholars concur with the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit.75 Still, 
disagreement amongst courts persists regarding what makes a water body 
navigable in fact.76  
In general, a water body is navigable in fact if it is susceptible of being 
used, in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce “over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade 
and travel on water.”77 Yet Louisiana courts, reciting similar definitions, 
have reached different conclusions regarding what physical characteristics 
must be present for a water body to be navigable in fact. In Burns v. 
Crescent Gun & Rod Club, the plaintiff sought a declaration that he had 
the right to recreationally fish in four water bodies near Lake 
Pontchartrain.78 Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that no 
commercial activities ever took place in these bodies of water and that the 
water bodies in question were “grass choked” year round and only 
susceptible to navigation by pirogues and small skiffs.79 Finding that 
navigable in fact “means when a stream is large enough to float a boat of 
some size, engaged in carrying trade,” the court held that this waterway 
was not navigable.80 In Ramsey River Road Property Owners Ass’n v. 
                                                                                                             
 72. 646 So. 2d 408, 411 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 73. Id. at 411. 
 74. Id.   
 75. See Lee Hargrave, “Statutory” and “Hortatory” Provisions of the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 43 LA. L. REV. 647, 660 (1983) (“If a 
nonnavigable stream becomes navigable, it would cease to be susceptible of 
private ownership and would become property of the State.”). 
 76. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 64, at 118 (noting that not all courts 
follow the same test). Given the enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 
33 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), one can make a strong argument that the United States has 
wholly occupied the field on navigation. 
 77. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (9 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see also 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 64, at 118. 
 78. 41 So. 249, 251 (La. 1906). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
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Reeves, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a slightly broader 
interpretation of navigable in fact.81 The court specifically held that the 
Bogue Falaya River was navigable in fact because it was deep enough to 
float logs down the river as part of a lumbering operation.82 In adopting 
this interpretation, the court cited The Montello, a United States Supreme 
Court case that decided a Wisconsin river was navigable despite its rapids 
and falls that “embarrassed the navigation of early days.”83 Noting that not 
every mode of commerce could successfully traverse the river, the 
Montello Court pronounced that “[t]he capability of use by the public for 
purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the 
navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use.”84 
Though most Louisiana courts readily agree that potential commercial 
use is necessary to find navigability,85 in Kieff v. Louisiana Land and 
Exploration Co., the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal suggested 
that the use of a water body by commercial fisherman or crabbers does not 
necessarily make a water body navigable in fact.86 In light of the 
abundance of jurisprudence suggesting that commercial use is inherently 
intertwined with a finding of navigability, the Fourth Circuit’s holding in 
Kieff seems untenable. Indeed, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana implied that mere commercial fishing 
activities can lead to a finding of navigability, even if those activities only 
                                                                                                             
 81. See 396 So. 2d 873, 876–77 (La. 1981) (“[I]n 1812 there was no 
substantial difference in the nature of the river at the respective locations. For 
instance, there was trial testimony that in the nineteenth century lumbering 
operations were carried on in the vicinity of defendant’s proposed bridge and that 
the lumber was floated down the Bogue Falaya to Covington. . . . We conclude 
that the district court and the Court of Appeal were correct in determining that the 
Bogue Falaya River at the point where defendants propose to build a bridge was 
navigable in fact . . . .”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 432 (1874). 
 84. Id. at 441. 
 85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist. v. 
Capdeville, 83 So. 421, 425 (La. 1919) (simply stated, a water course is navigable 
when “by its depth, width, and location [it] is rendered available for commerce”); 
Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 396 So. 2d at 876 (“[T]hey are navigable 
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”); State v. Aucoin, 
20 So. 2d 136, 159–61 (La. 1944) (noting that a water body must be available for 
commercial purposes to be navigable in fact). 
 86. See 779 So. 2d 85, 92 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (suggesting that use by 
commercial oystermen and crabbers does not constitute navigability). 
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occur seasonally.87 The district court’s holding seems more reasonable 
than that of the fourth circuit. Some of the most common forms of 
commerce or trade in coastal Louisiana are commercial fishing, oyster 
farming, crabbing, and shrimping.88 When an oysterman hauls in 400 
pounds of oysters and then transports them from his fishing area to the 
dock, one may reasonably conclude that he is engaging in commerce. 
Whether these kinds of commercial activities satisfy the definition of 
navigable in fact, however, is still an open question.  
Interpreting the existing jurisprudence, a water body existing in 1812 
or created by natural forces—such as erosion, subsidence, and sea level 
rise prior to State alienation89—that readily allows travel for commercial 
purposes is a natural navigable water body within the purview of article 
450. No law or jurisprudence, however, addresses whether a water body 
that submerges after State alienation is properly classified as a natural 
navigable water body.90 
2. The Traditional Definition of the Territorial Sea and its 
Extensions 
Similar to natural navigable water bottoms, land categorized as sea 
bottom belongs to the State under article 450.91 Ever since the legislature’s 
passage of Louisiana Revised Statutes title 49, section 3, “territorial sea” 
has referred to, at the very least, the seawater and sea bottoms between 
Louisiana’s coastline and its territorial boundary, which extends three 
miles from the coastline.92 The territorial sea likely reaches further inland, 
however. First discussed in Pollard v. Hagan, the equal footing doctrine 
                                                                                                             
 87. Cf. Boudreaux v. La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, No. 6:11-CV-0834, 
2014 WL 4219446 (W.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014) (refusing to grant summary 
judgment because Boudreaux offered evidence that he fished commercially in the 
disputed area). 
 88. See Plenty to Celebrate, LA. SEAFOOD, http://www.louisianaseafood.com 
/industry [perma.cc/EVR3-TMT6] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (noting that these 
industries have a vast effect on Louisiana’s economy). 
 89. This list of natural forces is illustrative. 
 90. See infra Part III.B. 
 91. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015). Although article 450 only explicitly 
includes “running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water 
bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore,” the bottom of the territorial sea is 
implicitly included. See Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838) (declaring that the 
bed of Lake Pontchartrain is insusceptible of private ownership and thus, by 
implication, classifying the Lake as “sea”). 
 92. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, 
§ 69, at 131. 
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granted all of the land under navigable waters, including land under 
seawaters, to the new states upon their admission into the Union.93 Though 
this doctrine only granted Louisiana ownership of sea bottoms up to the 
average high water mark in 1812,94 Louisiana Civil Code article 451 
establishes that Louisiana owns the sea bottom up to the highest normal 
level of the seawater during winter, without regard for any boundary set in 
1812.95 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Miami Corp. v. State followed 
the spirit of the Civil Code by implicitly concluding that the “highest 
ordinary level of the seawater during the winter season”96 is a dynamic 
boundary that shifts due to natural forces.97 Responding to the notion that 
the territorial sea extends further inland than the coastline, Louisiana 
courts created a distinct category of public water bodies—“arms of the 
sea”—that is governed by Article 450.98 
In Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court 
settled years of confusion regarding the definition of arms of the sea.99 
This case concerned a disagreement between the State and a private 
                                                                                                             
 93. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal 
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1997). 
 94. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993), 
remand to No. 85–1015, 1994 WL 374309 (E.D. La. July 7, 1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d 
1082 (5th Cir. 1995); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 131; cf. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 95. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 451; see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, 
at 131–32. 
 96. Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 2d 315, 322–23 (La. 1936). 
 97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451; see Miami Corp., 173 So. 2d at 322–23. 
 98. See, e.g., Zeller v. S. Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882); Morgan v. 
Negodich, 3 So. 636, 639 (La. 1887); Buras v. Salinovich, 97 So. 748, 750 (La. 
1923); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. c. 
 99. See 576 So. 2d 495, 501 (La. 1991). For many years, Louisiana courts did 
not provide a clear definition of “arm of the sea.” In D’albora v. Garcia, the 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal adopted an expansive interpretation of 
an “arm of the sea,” finding that when a body of water connected to an arm of the 
sea, and the tide ebbed and flowed regularly in that water body, that water body 
was also an arm of the sea. 144 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. Ct. App. 1962). In Morgan 
v. Negodich, the Louisiana Supreme Court, paying special attention to the route 
Gulf waters took to enter a bayou, adopted a more restrictive interpretation of 
“arm of the sea.” 3 So. 636, 639 (La. 1887) (finding that a water body forming a 
connecting link between an arm of the sea and another bay was not an arm of the 
sea). The Court in Morgan noted if the salt water in a water body adjacent to, or 
connected with, an arm of the sea does not result from the high tide flooding its 
banks, then that water body cannot be considered an arm of the sea. Id. at 639. 
Subsequent cases briefly discussed arms of the sea, but to what that term referred 
was unclear until Davis. 
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landowner over the ownership of a tract of land consisting of alluvion100 
located near the intersection between Shell Island Pass, a river, and Little 
Bay.101 A dispute over which waterway the alluvion bordered arose 
because, although alluvion formed on the banks of a river belongs to the 
bank owner,102 alluvion formed on the shores of an arm of the sea belongs 
to the State.103 Affirming the appellate court’s finding that Little Bay was 
an arm of the sea, the court delineated several factors that help determine 
whether a water body is an arm of the sea.104 If a water body is 
“immediately adjacent” to the Gulf such that it forms a “bay along the Gulf 
Coast,” then that water body is likely an arm of the sea.105 Similarly, if the 
water body’s marshline is “washed by the tidal waters of the Gulf,” then 
the water body is likely an arm of the sea.106 Applying these factors, the 
court found that arms of the sea are those “bodies of water in the vicinity 
of the open Gulf and which are directly overflowed by the waters of the 
Gulf.”107  
The existing jurisprudence clarifies that the State owns the bottoms of 
an arm of the sea when it existed prior to state alienation,108 as is the case 
with the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies. No law directly 
addresses, however, whether the State owns land that became a sea bottom 
after state alienation. 
3. The Traditional Definition of “Seashore” 
Similar to arms of the sea and natural navigable water bodies, if land 
is seashore, then that land is a public thing that the State owns.109 Article 
451 defines seashore as “the space of land over which the waters of the sea 
spread in the highest tide during the winter season.”110 According to 
Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, this definition necessarily includes the 
                                                                                                             
 100. Alluvion is defined as “[a]n accumulation of soil, clay, or other material 
deposited on the bank of a river.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 33–34 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 101. Davis Oil Co., 576 So. 2d at 496.  
 102. LA. CIV. CODE art. 499. 
 103. Id. art. 500. 
 104. Davis Oil Co., 576 So. 2d at 501. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 500. 
 109. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450. 
 110. Id. art. 451.  
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shores of arms of the sea and of the open gulf.111 Seashore, however, likely 
does not include the shores of lands merely subject to regular tidal 
overflow.112  
The Louisiana Supreme Court carved out this limitation in Morgan v. 
Negodich and Buras v. Salinovich.113 In Morgan, the parties disputed the 
ownership of oyster beds.114 One party believed that the oyster beds grew 
on a riverbank, while the other party believed that they grew on the 
seashore.115 In finding that the oyster beds grew on the riverbank, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the shores of a water body joining an 
arm of the sea with an inland bay are not seashore.116 Similarly, the Buras 
court found that marshlands ordinarily subject to overflow from gulf tides 
are not seashore.117 In that case, the court reasoned that the redactors of the 
Civil Code never intended for article 451 to include “any and all land that 
is subject to tidal overflow, however remote from the ‘seashore,’ as it is 
generally understood.”118 In both Morgan and Buras, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court implied that the distance between the disputed land and the 
sea, as well as the path of seawater that covers the land, are indicative of 
whether land is seashore.119 Thus, land is likely seashore only if seawater 
directly washes over it during “the highest tide [in] the winter season.”120  
Under Morgan and Buras, as with natural navigable water bottoms 
and sea bottoms, if submerged land was seashore prior to state alienation, 
then that land falls within the scope of article 450 and is State owned. Even 
so, though both Morgan and Buras implied that the State would own land 
that transformed into seashore after state alienation, no law or case directly 
addresses that proposition.  
                                                                                                             
 111. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 72, at 139. 
 112. See, e.g., Morgan v. Negodich, 3 So. 636 (La. 1887); Buras v. Salinovich, 
97 So. 748 (La. 1923); see also Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 41 So. 249 
(La. 1906). 
 113. See Morgan, 3 So. at 636; Buras, 97 So. at 748. 
 114. 3 So. 636. 
 115. See id. at 637. 
 116. Id. at 638–40. 
 117. See 97 So. at 749–50. 
 118. Id. at 750. 
 119. Cf. id. (“These expressions in the Code ‘the sea and its shores,’ and 
‘seashore,’ have reference to the gulf coast, and to the lakes, bays and sounds 
along the coast.”); Morgan, 3 So. at 636. 
 120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451 (2015). 
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III. LOUISIANA OWNS ALL SUBMERGED LAND FITTING UNDER ARTICLE 
450 REGARDLESS OF WHEN THAT LAND SUBMERGED 
Under article 450, the State owns several different types of land, 
including seashore,121 sea bottoms,122 and the beds and bottoms beneath 
Louisiana’s navigable waters. But consider a tract of private marshland 
that, in 1820, was located five miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico. As 
the Gulf waters rose, or as the land subsided, that tract became submerged 
under ten feet of water. Adhering to Louisiana’s public policy, 
Constitution, Civil Code, and the jurisprudential reasoning of many 
Louisiana courts, this tract of submerged marshland must fall within the 
scope of article 450 and therefore be owned by the State. Although no 
cases or doctrine direct a court’s analysis on this particular issue, seashore, 
sea bottoms, and navigable water bottoms created after state alienation are 
public things insusceptible of private ownership.123  
A. The State Owns Submerged Land That Bordered Natural Navigable 
Water Bodies 
As private land abutting a natural navigable water body erodes into 
that body, that land becomes part of the water body’s bottom, and, 
consequently, its ownership is transferred to Louisiana under article 
450.124 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Miami Corp., public 
policy and sound logic necessitate this result.125 In that case, Miami 
Corporation sought a declaration that it was the owner of an eroded area 
forming a portion of Grand Lake’s bed.126 The court noted that “[i]t 
                                                                                                             
 121. See id. (defining seashore as land directly flooded by seawater during the 
“highest tide during the winter season”). 
 122. Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 So. 2d 495, 501 (La. 1991) 
(explaining that sea bottoms include land underneath “bodies of water in the 
vicinity of the open Gulf and which are directly overflowed by the waters of the 
Gulf”). 
 123. This Comment only seeks to address instances where the transformation 
of land into an article 450 category is substantially due to natural forces.  
 124. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 323 (La. 1936) (“[W]hen 
submersion occurs, the submerged portion becomes a part of the bed or bottom of 
the navigable body of water in fact, and therefore the property of the State, by 
virtue of its inherent sovereignty, as a matter of law.”); Buras v. Ellzey, 233 So. 
2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1970); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 132. 
 125. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 316 (“It is the rule of property and of title in 
this State, and also a rule of public policy that the State as a sovereignty, holds 
title to the beds of navigable bodies of water.”); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.  
 126. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 316. 
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appears to be the rule that where the forces of nature . . . have operated on 
the banks of a navigable body of water . . . the submerged area becomes a 
portion of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership.”127 If the rule 
in Miami Corp. was not the law, the entire rim of land surrounding a public 
lake could erode and become private submerged land, thereby preventing 
public use of the lake.128 Thus, taking policy considerations into account, 
submerged land that formerly abutted a natural navigable water body must 
be a public thing under article 450. 
B. The State Owns the Bottoms of Natural Navigable Water Bodies 
Created After State Alienation 
Analyzing Louisiana’s jurisprudence that addresses the ownership of 
the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies created after state alienation 
proves to be quite difficult. No case directly presents the issue, and the 
courts that tangentially address the issue only provide a framework that 
might lead to improper interpretation.129 Fortunately, Louisiana’s public 
policy, interpretative maxims, and the Louisiana Constitution—despite the 
lack of guidance from Louisiana’s jurisprudence—lead to the conclusion 
that all navigable water bottoms should be State owned, regardless of 
when they became navigable.130  
Capturing the essence of Louisiana’s public policy, Chief Justice 
Fournet, in his dissent in California Co. v. Price, stated that a land grant 
including navigable water bottoms was “equivalent to a patent to air, or to 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 322. 
 128. Id. at 323. 
 129. See Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 
410–12 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that previous cases only dealt with water 
bodies navigable in 1812, and subsequently, answering the question as to water 
bodies that were non-navigable in 1812 but became navigable before severance). 
 130. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 590 (La. 1974) 
(“It has been the public policy of the State of Louisiana at all times since its 
admission into the Union that all navigable waters and the beds of same within its 
boundaries are common or public things and insusceptible of private ownership . . . .” 
(quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1107 (1954))); but see Delacroix Corp. v. Jones-
O’Brien, Inc., 597 So. 2d 65, 69–70 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (implying that the public 
policy discussed in Gulf Oil does not apply to inland navigable lakes). A 
landowner’s right of reclamation—the right to apply for a permit that allows a 
landowner to reclaim land that he has lost due to erosion by essentially rebuilding 
the land—is the only exception to the prohibition on private ownership of 
Louisiana’s natural navigable water bottoms. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
Louisiana’s submerged coastal environment remains privately owned, or at the very 
least, privately claimed. 
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the water running through the Mississippi river on its way to the sea.”131 
Chief Justice Fournet further explained that “[a]n arm of the sea is one of 
those things which all men may freely use conformable with the use for 
which it is intended by nature, and is among those things that are 
insusceptible of private ownership.”132 Courts consistently interpret this 
public policy to mean that Louisiana does not permit private control over 
the bottoms of channels of commerce; thus, those courts consistently find 
that navigable water bottoms existing in 1812 or created prior to state 
alienation are insusceptible of private ownership.133 Those courts did not 
address the ownership of water bodies that become navigable in fact after 
state alienation, however. “[P]rivately owned land does not become part 
of a navigable body of water” and thus does not become insusceptible of 
private ownership “when a nearby navigable body of water overflows its 
normal bed and temporarily covers the property.”134 But several sound 
reasons exist, in addition to strong public policy, for why land should be 
insusceptible of private ownership when that land indefinitely becomes the 
bottom of a navigable water body. 
A literal interpretation of article 450 dictates that these lands become 
public by operation of law.135 Article 450 does not distinguish between the 
bottoms of water bodies that became navigable in fact before severance 
from state ownership and water bodies that become navigable in fact after 
state alienation. The article simply states that the bottoms of natural 
navigable water bodies are public things.136 Obeying the maxim “where 
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish,” the ownership 
                                                                                                             
 131. Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1, 16 (La. 1953) (Fournet, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 133. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582 (“[N]avigable water bottoms 
other than rivers are public things insusceptible of private ownership.”); State v. 
Barras, 615 So. 2d 285, 287 (La. 1993) (“The beds of navigable waters are 
insusceptible of private ownership.”); Miami Corp., 173 So. at 326 (“But, in order 
to reach this conclusion, the court had to go counter to the long-established sound 
principles of public policy in our jurisprudence—that the title to the bottoms of 
navigable bodies of water belong to the State as a result of its inherent sovereignty 
and are insusceptible of private ownership.”); see also Vermilion Bay Land Co., 
646 So. 2d at 410–12 (noting that previous cases only dealt with water bodies 
navigable in 1812 and, subsequently, answering the question as to water bodies 
that were non-navigable in 1812 but became navigable before severance). 
 134. Walker Lands, Inc. v. E. Carroll Parish Police Jury, 871 So. 2d 1258, 
1264 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 135. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116 (noting that a literal 
interpretation of article 450 may lead to this conclusion); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
450 (2015). 
 136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450. 
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of the bottoms of newly navigable water bodies should revert to the 
State.137  
The Louisiana Constitution also supports this conclusion. Article IX, 
section 3 provides that “[t]he legislature shall neither alienate nor 
authorize the alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for 
purposes of reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through 
erosion.”138 In ratifying this provision, Louisiana’s voters expressed their 
desire to keep these water bottoms out of private ownership.139 Thus, “if a 
non-navigable stream” or other body of water “becomes navigable, it 
would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would become 
property of the state.”140 Further, nothing in the Louisiana Constitution, 
the Civil Code, or the jurisprudence suggests that a privately owned thing 
cannot become a public thing by operation of law. As such, as private land 
submerges beneath seawater or naturally navigable waterways, that 
private land becomes public by operation of law.141 
Lastly, if the bottoms of water bodies that become naturally navigable 
after state alienation were susceptible of private ownership, then the 
bottoms of a body of water large enough to support substantial commercial 
                                                                                                             
 137. A similar result would be reached in most other states. See, e.g., Tenney 
v. Dep’t of Health & Evntl. Control, 712 S.E.2d 395, 399–400 (S.C. 2011) (noting 
that when marshland erodes or becomes submerged because of changing tides, 
ownership reverts back to the state); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 
542, 550 (N.J. 2010) (“Under the common law, the owner of oceanfront property 
. . . loses to the State title over land that becomes tidally flowed as a result of 
erosion.”); see also TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 218 S.W.3d 173, 
184–85 (Tex. App. 2007) (explaining that the boundary of public and private 
ownership along water bodies is not static, and that as land becomes submerged, 
ownership reverts back to the State). 
 138. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
 139. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 660–61. 
 140. Id. at 661. 
 141. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 322 (La. 1936) (“It appears to be 
the rule that where the forces of nature—subsidence and erosion—have operated 
on the banks of a navigable body of water, regardless of whether it be a body of 
fresh water or the sea, or an arm of the sea, the submerged area becomes a portion 
of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership.”); Clinton W. Shinn, Of 
Coase, the Takings Clause, and the Inexorably Shrinking Marsh: A Review with 
Lagniappe, 29 S.U. L. REV. 271, 284–85 (2002) (“Without the vegetation, the soil 
crumbles away beneath the encroaching saltwater, first in pools, then ponds, then 
lakes and bays, all technically navigable and, thus, state owned. By operation of 
law, private marsh becomes public navigable water bottoms.”). Courts would 
likely not consider this change in ownership to be an expropriation of private 
property. See infra Part III.C. 
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activity could be private. If such a water body could be private, the owner 
could possibly interfere with trade.142 That result is impermissible because, 
under Article 450,143 the public domain indefinitely retains the right to use 
Article 450 waters and bottoms without private interference.144 
Considering Louisiana’s strong public policy opposing the alienation of 
navigable water bottoms from the State,145 the effects of a law that allows 
the private ownership of navigable water bottoms leads to absurd results 
that Louisiana’s legal regime should not tolerate. Therefore, as a principle 
of law and public policy, Louisiana must own land that becomes the 
bottom of a natural navigable water body after state alienation. 
C. The State Owns Sea Bottoms and Seashores Created After State 
Alienation 
As with the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, sea bottom and 
seashore created before state alienation is clearly insusceptible of private 
ownership.146 But whether land that transformed into sea bottom and 
seashore after state alienation is susceptible of private ownership remains 
undecided. Several courts have implied that the bottoms and shores of 
                                                                                                             
 142. Although private ownership of this land would present problems for 
individuals attempting to engage in trade in these water bodies, the federal 
navigational servitude, derived from the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, would likely substantially curtail the ability of the private landowner 
to interfere with trade in this instance. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also 
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(noting the navigational servitude gives the federal government “a dominant 
servitude” that allows it “to regulate and control the waters of the United States 
in the interest of commerce”).  
 143. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (declaring that the waters and bottoms 
of natural navigable water bodies are always state-owned). 
 144. See id. art. 450 cmt. b (noting that the nature of public things is that they 
are dedicated to public use and held in the public trust for such use). 
 145. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 586 (La. 1974). 
 146. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, 
§ 72, at 139. 
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arms of the sea and the Gulf of Mexico are always State owned;147 
however, some older jurisprudence suggests otherwise.148  
Citing this older jurisprudence, Professor Yiannopoulos suggests that 
private individuals may own portions of sea bottom.149 Still, Louisiana law 
only permits sea bottom ownership in extremely rare cases where the State 
issued patents to the sea bottom prior to 1921.150 Those patents’ validity is 
a consequence of a line of controversial jurisprudence,151 which further 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of private ownership of sea bottom and 
seashore. As to sea bottoms created since 1921, however, Louisiana law is 
unequivocal: “[W]hen the water bottom in question lies . . . under the sea 
or an arm of the sea, it is explicitly included among the inalienable things 
vested in the State.”152 Thus, submerged land that becomes sea bottom or 
seashore after state alienation is a public thing that the State owns. 
                                                                                                             
 147. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582–83 (“Moreover, when the 
water bottom in question lies, as in this case, under the sea or an arm of the sea, it 
is explicitly included among the inalienable things vested in the State.”); Fradella 
Const., Inc. v. Roth, 503 So. 2d 25, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (“Lands that have 
become sea bottoms as well as accretions formed at a seashore belong to the 
State.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1 (La. 1953). 
 149. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 132. 
 150. Id. 
 151. In California Co. v. Price, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in the face of 
three vigorous dissents, declared that patents to navigable water bottoms and sea 
bottoms were valid. 74 So. 2d at 13–14. For the next 20 years, courts criticized 
that opinion and often attempted to circumvent the holding. Finally, in 1974, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d 576, overruled California 
Co. and all cases applying the same reasoning, noting those cases were based upon 
“erroneous reasoning.” But see Delacroix Corp. v. Jones-O’Brien, Inc., 597 So. 
2d 65, 69–70 (La. Ct. App. 1992). In Delacroix Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that 
the reasoning in Gulf Oil Corp. did not apply to an interior lake. Id. By doing so, 
the court may have given new life to California Co. and its progeny. 
 152. Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582–83; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012) 
(“The State of Louisiana owns in full and complete ownership the waters of the 
Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of the Gulf and the beds and shores of the Gulf 
and the arms of the Gulf, including all lands that are covered by the waters of the 
Gulf and its arms either at low tide or high tide, within the boundaries of 
Louisiana.”); see also La. Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm’n of La., 51 So. 706, 
711 (La. 1910) (“Hence, there can be no such thing in this state as private 
ownership of the bed of a navigable river, and a fortiori can there be no such thing 
as private ownership of the bed of the sea or of an arm of the sea.”); cf. Cal. Co., 
74 So. 2d at 17–29 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting) (citing to nine different legislative 
acts clearly evincing a public policy opposed to private ownership of sea bottoms: 
Act No. 106 of 1886, Act No. 110 of 1892, Act No. 121 of 1896, Act No. 153 of 
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The Louisiana Constitution of 1974,153 the Louisiana Civil Code,154 
and the Louisiana Revised Statutes155 dictate that natural navigable water 
bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore are insusceptible of private ownership. 
None of these sources indicate that exceptions exist or that this rule should 
not apply to lands that, after state alienation, submerge due to natural 
forces. Rather, jurisprudence and legal scholarship suggest that classifying 
newly navigable water bottoms, newly created sea bottoms, and newly 
created seashore as public things under article 450 is reasonable.156 
Further, reading article 450 in light of the majority view of Louisiana’s 
public policy157 leads to the conclusion that those newly submerged lands 
fall within the scope of article 450. Thus, all submerged land exhibiting 
the characteristics of the water bodies explicitly included under article 450, 
regardless of when they began to exhibit those characteristics, are public 
things that the State owns.  
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR STATE ACTION 
As Louisiana law currently stands, no provision directly addresses 
whether ownership changes when coastal land submerges due to erosion, 
subsidence, sea-level rise, and other similar forces. Even so, the legislature 
could fill the gap by drafting a new revised statute that incorporates the 
spirit of code articles, constitutional provisions, and current statutes. 
                                                                                                             
1902, Act No. 52 of 1904, Act No. 189 of 1910, Act No. 54 of 1914, Act No. 139 
of 1924, and Act No. 67 of 1932). 
 153. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (“The legislature shall neither alienate nor 
authorize the alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for purposes 
of reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through erosion.”). 
 154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (“Public things that belong to the state are 
such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, 
the territorial sea, and the seashore.”); see also id. art. 450 cmt. c (“The first 
category consists of things which according to constitutional and legislative 
provisions are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its political 
subdivisions.”). 
 155. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012). 
 156. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 322 (La. 1936); Vermilion Bay 
Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 411–12 (La. Ct. App. 1994); 
Hargrave, supra note 75, at 660–61; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116 
(noting that a literal interpretation of article 450 may lead to this conclusion). 
 157. See, e.g., Miami Corp., 173 So. at 326 (“But, in order to reach this 
conclusion, the court had to go counter to the long-established sound principles 
of public policy in our jurisprudence—that the title to the bottoms of navigable 
bodies of water belong to the State as a result of its inherent sovereignty and are 
insusceptible of private ownership.”); Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 590. 
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A. The Inadequacy of Non-Legislative Solutions  
According to the massive amount of scientific data, Louisiana’s coastal 
lands are perpetually submerging, shifting, and rising, particularly in the 
changing delta lobes of the Mississippi River.158 This pervasive 
environmental and societal change necessitates legal adaptation, because 
that change blurs the traditional line between private and public property. 
The legislature must address the ownership of submerged lands and can do 
so in a variety of ways. 
The legislature could instruct the State Lands Office to conduct a more 
comprehensive review of Louisiana’s coastal lands. A detailed survey may 
reveal the submerged lands that the State believes it owns, thus giving the 
public an idea of what lands it can utilize. An extensive survey, however, 
would be costly,159 would likely invite litigation from landowners who feel 
that the State is informally encroaching on their land,160 and would not 
provide finality with respect to land title statewide.161 
Conversely, the State, seeking a declaration of its ownership of certain 
submerged tracts of land, could file suit against private landowners. This 
action would be conclusive of land title, and, if the State won, would result 
in more public land.162 Still, this process would be expensive and 
cumbersome. Perhaps more importantly, a court could find that even as new 
land submerges well beneath water, title remains with the private 
landowner.  
Although both of these possible solutions have some benefits, neither 
solution attacks the heart of the problem: no clear pronouncement of 
Louisiana law exists regarding newly submerged land. The only option to 
solve this problem is to draft a piece of legislation directly addressing the 
ownership of submerged land; however, in doing so, the legislature must 
diligently draft the legislation to avoid potential obstructions. 
                                                                                                             
 158. See Anderson, supra note 2; see also Frazier, supra note 16; McLindon, 
supra note 16. 
 159. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
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B. Putting to Rest the State’s Potential Concerns Regarding Legislation 
Asserting Ownership over Certain Submerged Lands 
The oil and gas industry owns much of the coastal land in Louisiana and 
contributes significantly to the Louisiana economy.163 As a result, that 
industry’s presence influences the State’s decisions. If the Louisiana 
Legislature passed a statute claiming ownership over a vast majority of 
submerged land in coastal Louisiana, the statute may disrupt thousands of 
titles to land where the oil and gas industry is heavily invested.164 Louisiana 
may not have the funding or resources to litigate thousands of title claims. 
Additionally, the State may be hesitant to enact legislation declaring 
ownership over formerly private lands because doing so may give rise to 
takings issues under the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions.165 Inevitably, 
private landowners would claim that the State could not take their land 
without giving just compensation. Although these two concerns are 
significant, neither should keep the State from declaring ownership over all 
submerged lands constituting sea bottom, seashore, and navigable water 
bottom. 
1. The Takings Clause Would Not Apply to the Reversion of 
Ownership of Natural Navigable Water Bottoms, Sea Bottoms, or 
Seashore 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, sections 2 
and 4, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 prohibit the expropriation of 
private property without just compensation.166 A reversion of ownership due 
to natural submersion may violate this core principle.167  
                                                                                                             
 163. See Newest Economic Impact Study Reinforces Oil and Gas Industry’s 
Importance to Louisiana, supra note 35. 
 164. Cf. Delacroix Corp. v. Jones-O’Brien, Inc., 597 So. 2d 65, 70 (La. Ct. 
App. 1992) (noting that Phillips Petroleum Co. & Cinque Bambini P’ship v. 
Mississippi & Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc. “sets the stage for disruption of land titles 
across all Louisiana wetlands”). 
 165. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 661. 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, § 4. 
 167. An open question exists regarding precisely what action or inaction by 
the State would constitute man-caused submersion and what would constitute 
natural submersion. Some believe that the State may be inclined to neglect coastal 
erosion and subsidence problems, which would inevitably lead to the submersion 
of portions of Louisiana’s coast and more state-owned land. Additionally, some 
scholars believe that extensive dredging and other types of disruption by oil and 
gas companies in prior decades have greatly contributed to Louisiana’s current 
rate of land loss. This Comment does not endeavor to decide where to draw the 
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According to Professor Yiannopoulos, a “[s]trong argument may be 
made that the acquisition by the state of the ownership of the beds of 
formerly non-navigable water bodies is a taking of property without 
compensation.”168 After all, the idea that a person can buy waterfront 
property from the State and then have to give that land back, free of charge, 
once the property submerges seems unfair. Still, to prevail on a takings 
clause claim, a party must prove that governmental action proximately and 
directly caused the damage or taking.169 When land naturally submerges so 
significantly that the submersion falls under article 450, government action 
does not cause the land to revert to State ownership.170 Rather, the change 
in ownership occurs by operation of law.171 Yet Louisiana creates the law. 
One may reasonably conclude that Louisiana’s adoption of a statute 
dictating that the State owns formerly private land would cause 
unconstitutional takings unless the State justly compensated private 
landowners. This argument, however, would call into question several 
Louisiana Civil Code provisions that dictate that ownership of a thing 
changes when natural forces change the categorical nature of that thing.172 
For example, when natural forces overtake, destroy, or damage a public road 
bordering a river, thereby changing the nature of that road into a river 
bottom, Louisiana Civil Code article 666 requires the owner of the land 
underneath the road to furnish more land, without compensation, so that the 
State can construct a new road.173 
                                                                                                             
line between man-caused submersion and natural submersion to such a particular 
extent. Rather, the purpose of this Comment is to offer a possible solution to one 
problem and to lay a foundation for more extensive debate concerning the many 
land-loss-related problems confronting Louisiana. 
 168. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116. 
 169. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149–50 (1924); see also 
Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
a governmental body or “state actor” has to be involved in the taking for a party 
to be subject to a takings claim). 
 170. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 661 (“[I]f a nonnavigable stream becomes 
navigable, it would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would 
become property of the state. The argument that such a change in ownership may 
be a taking without due process (absent compensation) probably falls because 
such a loss is not caused by the state itself.” (footnote omitted)). 
 171. See Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App. 1986) 
(explaining that, with respect to water bottoms, the state is vested with something 
that looks like “instantaneous prescription” and that ownership reverts by 
“operation of law”); see also River Lands Fleeting Corp. v. Ashland Plantation, 
Inc., 498 So. 2d 38, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 172. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 655, 666, 751 (2015). 
 173. See id. art. 666. 
2016] COMMENT 917 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Louisiana Constitution impliedly supports the idea that 
no taking occurs when natural forces overtake privately owned land.174 The 
constitution suggests that navigable water bottoms are always State owned, 
thereby implying that no taking need to occur for the State to become owner 
of land that has eroded or subsided into a navigable water bottom.175 This 
logic applies a pari to sea bottoms and seashore. Further, such a notion is 
not exclusive to Louisiana176 and is consistent with the sovereign nature of 
navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore. Thus, when ownership 
changes because natural forces move property boundaries, the change 
occurs automatically and does not create a taking of private property. 
2. Concerns of Litigation Expenses are Unwarranted 
Louisiana, although the rightful owner, may be inclined to avoid 
declaring ownership of submerged lands because state officials do not want 
to fund the resulting mass of litigation. Most of Louisiana’s coastal 
marshlands are privately owned,177 and the landowners would be quick to 
sue if the State threatened to absorb their valuable lands. The “freeze 
statute,”178 which leaves preexisting mineral rights on submerged lands 
unaffected when title to that property reverts to the State, would likely deter 
some litigation, however.179 Additionally, a piece of legislation declaring 
State ownership would be presumptively valid,180 meaning that parties 
challenging the statute would face an uphill battle, thereby deterring more 
litigation. Though these considerations may limit the oncoming litigation, 
the prospect of future mineral interests would prompt most prominent, 
affluent private landowners to sue. Even so, the State could address the 
remaining litigation by asking a court to join all plaintiffs sharing a common 
interest into one suit or by passing a special venue statute to limit the 
                                                                                                             
 174. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.  
 175. See id. This provision does allow for a private landowner to reclaim 
navigable water bottoms lost through erosion; however, having the right of 
reclamation necessarily presumes that the ownership of the eroded land changed 
in the first instance due to the erosion.  
 176. See supra note 137. 
 177. See Anderson, supra note 2. 
 178. Though the “freeze statute” is still in force, its existence is constitutionally 
questionable because the statute may violate the public trust doctrine. A discussion 
of this statute’s constitutionality is outside the scope of this Comment, however. 
 179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1151 (2006). 
 180. City of New Orleans v. Toca, 75 So. 238, 239 (La. 1917) (“A statute or 
ordinance is not to be supposed to have been adopted without due deliberation . . . . 
This gives rise to a presumption of validity in favor of the legislative action . . . .”). 
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locations where suits against the State could be brought, in hopes of 
consolidating the litigation.181 Thus, despite an expected spike in litigation 
and the possibility of takings claims, neither practical nor constitutional 
concerns should be sufficient to prevent the legislature from enacting this 
long-overdue legislation.  
C. A Revised Statute to Address the Ownership of Submerged Land 
The legislation that this Comment proposes includes the benefits that 
the two lesser solutions offer and also unites certain provisions of 
Louisiana’s law with Louisiana’s public policy, which dictates that the State 
must own certain submerged lands.182 Article IX, section 3 of the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974 provides that the State may not alienate a navigable 
water bottom unless that land became bottom via erosion, and the previous 
landowners want to rebuild the land.183 Thus, this constitutional provision 
implies that when land becomes a navigable water bottom via erosion, the 
State owns that land.184 Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:3 
states that the State owns all seawater and sea bottom of the Gulf of Mexico 
and its arms within Louisiana’s territorial boundary.185 Though this statute 
does not directly address sea bottoms and seashores that natural forces 
created after state alienation, its spirit dictates that no sea bottom or seashore 
is susceptible to private ownership. 
The proposed statute, meshing the clear language found in those 
constitutional and statutory provisions with new language reflecting 
Louisiana’s public policy, reads as follows: 
When, due to natural forces including but not limited to erosion, 
subsidence, and sea-level rise, land becomes so submerged that it 
forms the bottom or bed of a navigable water body, or the bottoms 
or shores of the sea, including the bottoms and shores of arms of the 
sea, then that land becomes a public thing insusceptible of private 
                                                                                                             
 181. For an example of a venue statute specially drafted to deal with claims 
against the State, see Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:5104(A) (Supp. 2005) 
(providing that all lawsuits brought against the State or a state agency “shall be 
instituted before the district court of the judicial district in which the state capitol 
is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the 
cause of action arises”). 
 182. See supra note 130. 
 183. The logic applying to eroded land that becomes navigable water bottom 
would apply a pari to land that becomes navigable water bottom via other natural 
processes like subsidence and sea-level rise. 
 184. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
 185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012). 
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ownership. This provision applies regardless of whether land 
became submerged after State alienation.186 
By following the spirit and the letter of Louisiana’s existing law, this 
new statute puts an end to much of the uncertainty regarding submerged 
land ownership and provides courts with a definite rule to address a problem 
that will arise with increasing frequency in the coming years.  
CONCLUSION 
Alluding to legal systems’ propensity to rely on outdated principles of law, 
Justice McLean of the United States Supreme Court noted, “[a]ntiquity has its 
charms . . . but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently found 
in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs . . . .”187 Though he 
delivered this message as a warning regarding outdated admiralty laws,188 his 
words aptly fit the situation currently confronting Louisiana’s coastal property 
law. Either the legislature can do nothing and allow the complete confusion 
regarding the ownership and use of submerged lands to continue, or the 
legislature can revise the law governing the ownership of submerged lands to 
reflect the dynamic nature of Louisiana’s coastal environment. Because coastal 
lands are rapidly sinking, the legislature must adopt a statute capable of 
dealing with land submersion. This Comment proposes adopting a statute 
that will bring the law in the right direction.189 This statute will provide 
clarity regarding submerged-land ownership and use while placing these 
lands in the hands of their rightful owner, the people of Louisiana. The 
legislature is aware of the issues that our current, static law creates with 
respect to Louisiana’s ever-changing coastal environment. Before millions 
                                                                                                             
 186. This statute should not be interpreted to abdicate, in any way, Louisiana’s 
affirmative duty to conserve and preserve its natural resources under the Public 
Trust Doctrine. 
 187. Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307 (1857) 
(McLean, J., concurring). 
 188. See id. (warning that the United States’ admiralty laws improperly relied 
on old, misconstrued statutes instead of relying more heavily on progressive civil 
law rules). 
 189. The proposed statute will not mend this entire area of law. Even so, this 
Comment will hopefully prompt scholarly discussion and debate regarding 
significant issues that are confronting Louisiana. 
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more acres of Louisiana’s coastal land give way to Mother Nature’s will, 
the legislature must mend Louisiana’s outdated land classification regime.  
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